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Most  settled  parts  of  Australia  experience  low  and  highly  variable  rainfall  levels.  Both 
medium-term  cycles  such  as  the  Southern  Oscillation  and  longer  term  climate  change 
contribute uncertainty in additional to that arising from seasonal ﬂuctuations.  It follows that 
uncertainty is an inherent feature of water management in Australia. In addition, the policy 
process itself generates uncertainty. As new knowledge about water systems emerges and 
new demands, such as increased concerns about environmental ﬂows, arise, policies must 
adjust. The adjustment process inevitably creates uncertainty for both new and existing water 
users. It follows that the allocation of risk and uncertainty is a crucial problem in the design 
of institutions for water management in Australia. 
2Water management in Australia: dealing with 
uncertainty 
The weather is inherently uncertain, and few aspects of weather are more uncertain than 
rainfall in Australia. Of the world’s major river systems, the Murray-Darling has not only the 
lowest, but by far the most variable rainfall in its catchment.
It is natural, then, to expect that the management of uncertainty should be a central issue in 
Australian water management, and, in important respects, this is the case.
However, paradoxical outcomes are never far away in relation to water. The oft-repeated fact 
that Australia  is  the  driest  continent  in  the  world  has  naturally  led  governments  to  take 
responsibility for water supply, which has then encouraged the view that, as a necessity, water 
should be supplied free of charge, even for non-essential or frivolous purposes: exactly the 
opposite of the reasoning that might be expected in a country where water is particularly 
scarce.
Similarly, the very prevalence of uncertainty has, in some cases, led to demands for perfect 
security, either through technological approaches to ‘droughtprooﬁng’, through regulatory 
policies designed to protect water-users from risk and uncertainty and through market-based 
policies based on the assumption that clearly-deﬁned property rights can reduce uncertainty 
to bundles of state-contingent claim. The quest to eliminate uncertainty is futile. Uncertainty 
can be managed, allocated and sometimes mitigated; it can never be eliminated.
In  recent  years,  the  central  role  of  risk  and  uncertainty  in  water  management  has  been 
recognised more and more explicitly. Principles of risk allocation and mitigation have played 
a central role in the formulation of the National Water Initiative (COAG 2004). 
The chapter is organised as follows. 
The main focus of attention will be on the Murray-Darling Basin. The Basin accounts for … 
per cent of Australian agricultural production. Moreover, the problems of the Basin have been 
a major concern for Australian governments and have shaped responses to broader policy 
issues relating to water management. 
3Sources of uncertainty
Both medium-term cycles such as the Southern Oscillation and longer term climate change 
contribute uncertainty in additional to that arising from seasonal ﬂuctuations.  It follows that 
uncertainty is an inherent feature of water management in Australia. Agricultural producerrs 
are also subject to considerable demand uncertainty. In addition, the policy process itself 
generates uncertainty. 
Annual and seasonal variation in rainfall
The Murray-Darling system has not only the lowest but the most variable and unpredictable 
rainfall of any of the worlds major river systems. Rainfall is variable and unpredictable on a 
range of time scales, from the very short term through annual variations to multi-year cycles 
such as those arising from the El Nino/Southern Oscillation phenomenon.
The distribution of natural ﬂows in the system is characterised by high variance and high 
skewness. The mean annual outﬂow under natural conditions is about 12 300GL  and the 
median 
From a Basin-wide perspective, there has been a shift from a steady variation in mid-range 
ﬂows under natural conditions to a dominance of very low ﬂows and occasional high ﬂow 
events (Thomson 1994, 10). 
In  its  natural  state,  the  Murray-Darling  system  typically  displayed  marked  seasonal 
variability  in  ﬂows,  with  high  ﬂows  in  Spring,  following  the  melting  of  snow  in  the 
Australian Alps and low ﬂows in late Summer  and Autumn. However, this pattern was 
commonly disturbed by droughts and ﬂoods, which were, and remain, unpredictable. Not 
only  has  irrigation  reduced  unpredictable  seasonal  variation,  it  has  altered  the  dominant 
pattern of ﬂow, reducing the spring peak and increasing ﬂows in summer, when water is 
required for irrigation and urban water use.
Climate change
Until recently, it seemed reasonable to assume that, despite marked variations over timescales 
up to a decade, climate was reasonably stable in the long run. However, there is increasingly 
4clear  evidence  that  human  activity,  including  the  burning  of  carbon-based  fuels,  and  the 
clearance of forests has led to an increase in the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse 
gases such as carbon dioxide, resulting in anthropogenic climate change, commonly referred 
to as ‘global warming’.
While it is generally agreed that anthropogenic climate change is taking place, there is little 
certainty concerning the current and likely future rate of anthropogenic global warming. Even 
greater uncertainty surrounds effects on rainfall patterns, particularly at the regional level.
Jones at al (2001) project a a decline in winter and spring rainfall by the year 2030. and are 
uncertain  about  impacts  in  summer  and  autumn.    Average  temperature,  and  therefore 
evaporation,  is  expected  to  increase  in  all  areas.  The  two  effects  interact,  with  greater 
increases in evaporation likely in regions and seasons where rainfall declines.
Demand uncertainty
There is also uncertainty about the demand for water. Agricultural demand for water is a 
derived  demand,  ultimately  determined  by  the  demand  for  the  products  of  irrigated 
agriculture  and  by  the  opportunity  cost  of  the  best  dryland  alternative.  Given  a  derived 
demand curve, and a market in which water rights are freely traded, the quantity demanded 
by any individual producer will be determined by the market price.
Demand for water for urban use is less predictable, since it depends, to a large extent, on 
policy decisions. At present, government policy in Victoria prohibits the diversion of water 
from  the  Murray  catchment  to  Melbourne,  even  though  the  value  of  water  in  the  urban 
market (net of pumping, storage, treatment and reticulation costs) is considerably greater than 
its value in agricultural use.  Similarly, although Adelaide draws on the Murray for some of 
its water supply, there is a considerable gap between the marginal value of water in urban and 
rural uses.
A change in policy, allowing urban and rural water uses to compete directly in the market, 
would  lead  to  a  signiﬁcant  upward  movement  in  the  demand  for  water.    In  the  policy 
environment that has existed until now, strong opposition from rural water users has rendered 
any substantial changes in policy politically infeasible. However, once water rights became 
fully tradeable, an increase in demand would produce a windfall capital gain for holders of 
5water rights who are willing to sell. It is likely, therefore, that there will be a division of 
views  between  rural  water  users  who  wish  to  continue  irrigation,  and  perhaps  purchase 
additional water, and those who are willing sellers. Members of the ﬁrst group will lose from 
hgiehr prices while members of the second group will gain. A very similar division has been 
observed in relation to the conversion of farmland to residential use.
In view of the rapid increase in diversions, prior to the cap, there is little likelihood that, if the 
price of water is set equal to the marginal cost of diversion, aggregate demand will fall short 
of total available supply.  Hence, the equilibrating process will be one in which the price is 
determined by the intersection of the demand curve with an upper limit to total extractions 
imposed by policy. Currently, this limit is set by the Cap, but in future it will be set under the 
conditions set out in the National Water Initiative. 
Policy uncertainty
Policies regarding the provision, allocation and pricing of water for irrigation have varied 
substantially over time. In general, the policy orientation prior to about 1980 represented a 
‘developmentalist’  approach,  in  which  governments  took  the  lead  in  constructing  and 
ﬁnancing irrigation works and set water prices, often below operating costs and almost never 
at a level that allowed a signiﬁcant return to capital.  As Randall (…) notes, such policies are 
commonly adopted in the ‘expansion’ phase of water management systems, when ….
More recently, policies more typically associated with a ‘mature’ phase of water management 
have been adopted. These policies reﬂect the pressures that arise when extractions approach, 
or exceed, the capacity of the system to supply water on a sustainable basis. This pressure is 
reﬂected  in  conﬂict  between  competing  water  users,  increased  concerns  about  adverse 
environmental effects of water management 
Another  manifestation  or  maturity  the  adoption  of  techniques  such  as  extraction  of 
groundwater and capture of surface ﬂows, in response to limits on access to in-stream ﬂows. 
Such  actions  produce  a  cycle  in  which  policy  responses  designed  to  restrict  access  to 
previously unregulated sources prompt a search for less easily accessible, but unregulated, 
sources, as well as actions designed to exploit weaknesses in the regulatory framework.
In parallel with this process, policymakers and water users are discovering new information 
6about the behaviour of the system under conditions of stress, and are adjusting and reﬁning 
estimates of likely future water availability in the light of this information. This process has 
no natural endpoint, but if patterns of use are broadly constant over some period, and  climate 
change is slow and reasonably predictably, the accuracy of such estimates should improve 
steadily over time.
In this context, policy uncertainty is inevitable. An attempt to ﬁx policy in advance would 
imply  a  failure  to  adapt  to  new  information.  The  result  would  be  a  steadily  increasing 
divergence  between  a  ﬁxed  policy  position  and  the  optimal  response  to  changed 
circumstances, leading eventually to the breakdown of the policy, commonly in a costly and 
chaotic fashion, as with the Reserve Price Scheme for wool.
Some proponents of policy certainty have sought to resolve the problem by specifying, in 
advance, responses to every conceivable contingency. While contingency planning is often 
desirable, the idea that policy certainty can be achieved in this way is illusory. Inevitably, 
contingencies will emerge that have not been adequately anticipated or to which the planned 
response turns out to be sub-optimal.
 The impossibility of eliminating uncertainty
The  uncertainties  that  surround  agriculture  have  produced  many  proposals  for  policy 
interventions aimed at eliminating or mitigating uncertainty.  Over time, however, it has been 
recognised that the complete elimination of uncertainty is neither feasible nor desirable. In 
the debate on this topic, issues of price uncertainty and climatic uncertainty have been closely 
intertwined, so it is useful to consider both.
The failure of price stabilsation
In relation to price uncertainty, Hancock (1961, pp. 66-7)  summed up the attitudes that 
prevailed for much of the twentieth century:
The law which [Australians] understand is the positive law of the State 
—  the  democratic  State  which  seeks  social  justice  by  the  path  of 
7individual  rights.  The  mechanism  of  international  prices,  which 
signals the world’s need from one country to another and invites the 
nations to produce more of this commodity and less of that, belongs to 
an entirely different order. It knows no rights, but only necessities. 
The  Australians  have  never  felt  disposed  to  submit  to  these 
necessities. They have insisted that their governments must struggle to 
soften them or elude them or master them.
Governments responded to demand for greater certainty in prices by creating a range of price 
stablisation and underwriting schemes, of which the most notable was the Reserve Price 
Scheme for Wool, in which a buffer stock was used to ﬁx a minimum world price for wool. 
The collapse of the Reserve Price Scheme in 1991, which was followed by years of low 
prices  as  the  stockpile  was  gradually  sold  off,  contributed  to  the  abandonment  of  price 
stabilisation as a policy goal, and increasing reliance on market instruments.
The abandonment of price stabilisation inﬂuenced discussions of public policy in relation to 
drought and other forms of climatic uncertainty.  The main effect was to increase emphasis on 
methods  by  which  farmers  and  other  water  users  could  plan  for,  and  adapt  to,  climatic 
variability and uncertainty, and to discourage attempts to eliminate uncertainty.
Drought policy
Until fairly recently, droughts were viewed as exceptional natural disasters, requiring the 
application of emergency measures. The traditional approach to drought policy was centred 
on the administrative policy of `drought declaration' of districts, normally at the discretion of 
State governments. A variety of relief measures, which varied over time and between states, 
was made available to farmers in `drought declared' areas. Examples included subsidies for 
the purchases of fodder, low-interest loans, and cash grants. The implicit policy model was 
that  of  an  unpredictable  natural  disaster,  like  an  earthquake.  Policy  was  focused  on  the 
provision of assistance to farmers who had suffered, or who were exposed to, losses as a 
result of drought.
This  policy  was  criticised  by  economists  including  Freebairn  (1983),  who  argued  that  it 
undermined incentives to prepare appropriately for drought and encouraged practices such as 
overstocking.  Studies  of  the  implementation  of  drought  relief  in  the  1980s  reinforced 
8Freebairn's  arguments  and  raised  new  concerns.  Only  a  minority  of  eligible  producers 
received any relief. In Queensland, 36 per cent of the state had been drought declared every 
one in three years, and over the period 1984-85 to 1988-89, 40 per cent of relief had gone to 5 
per cent of the claimants (Smith, Hutchinson,and McArthur 1992).
The main outcome of the Australian debate was the adoption of the National Drought Policy 
in 1992. O'Meagher (2003) summarises the key features of the policy.\ Its stated rationale is 
that `Drought is one of several sources of uncertainty affecting farm businesses and is part of 
the  farmer's  normal  operating  environment.  Its  effects  can  be  reduced  through  risk 
management  practices  which  take  all  situations  into  account,  including  drought  and 
commodity price downturns.' The key policy implication is that `farmers will have to assume 
greater  responsibility  for  managing  the  risks  arising  from  climatic  variability.  This  will 
require the integration of ﬁnancial and business management with production and resource 
management  to  ensure  that  ﬁnancial  and  physical  resources  of  farm  businesses  are  used 
efﬁciently.' 
The isses surrounding drought policy have been analysed by Quiggin and Chambers (2004) 
using a graphical version of the state-contingent production model developed by Chambers 
and Quiggin (2000). Quiggin and Chambers (2004) showed that the anticipated availability fo 
drought relief would induce farmers to adopt more risky production strategies, such as high 
stocking rates, and argued that market-based measures, such as rainfall insurance, had the 
potential to offset risk without distorting production decisions.
Irrigation and ‘droughtprooﬁng’ 
For much of the 20th century, irrigation was presented1, in combination with relief policies 
directed at dryland agriculture, as a method of ‘droughtprooﬁng’ the agricultural sector.  The 
idea  is  that  a  guaranteed  supply  of  irrigation  water  would  eliminate  reliance  on  variable 
natural rainfall, and thereby  
As has already been noted, irrigation allows for a more stable ﬂow of water, and for the 
availability of irrigation water to be used to offset ﬂuctuations in natural ﬂows. Nevertheless, 
the  idea  of  complete  stabilisation,  with  fully  secure  water  allocations,  does  not  make 
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1  Technological solutions, most notably cloud-seeding, were also investigated without successeconomic sense, since either water would be under-used in high ﬂow years or investments in 
storage would be excessive. On the other hand, if farmers design their production strategies 
to take advantage of high-ﬂow years, they will inevitably incur losses in low ﬂows years.
Many  of  the  ideas  put  forward  in  the  past  were  revived  by  the  Farmhand  Foundation, 
established  in  2002,  which  canvassed  ideas  such  as  large  scale  use  of  piping  and 
reconsideration of the Bradﬁeld scheme.  These ideas were subject to vigourous criticism, 
notably from the Wentworth Group, and the Farmhand chairman recently observed ‘While 
there is no one way to ‘drought-proof’ Australia, we continue to be reminded the hard 
way that we live in the driest inhabited country on the planet and that we cannot 
continue to use water as we have been doing these past two centuries (Farmhand 
Foundation 2005).
Guarantees of resource access
In the presence of variable and uncertain supplies of water, or other resources, it is natural fo 
users to seek security of access.  It is, of course, possible to guarantee access for some users. 
However, resource security is, in large measure, a zero-sum commodity. The more security is 
given to one group of users, the less there is for everybody else.
As  will  be  discussed  below,  well-deﬁned  systems  of  property  rights  can  help  to  resolve 
competing demands for resource security by allowing for a variety of contingent trades in 
rights. However, accurate deﬁnition of property rights is only feasible when the availability 
of the resource is well understood. 
Risk reduction, risk allocation and risk management
Risk and uncertainty cannot be eliminated. But there are a variety of measures for reducing 
uncertainty, and for managing and allocating risk.
Reducing uncertainty
Uncertainty can be reduced with improved information. In particular, improved methods of 
weather forecasting can reduce climatic uncertainty. Although there have been signiﬁcant 
improvements  in  short-term  forecasting  (up  to  seven  days)  in  recent  years,  these  are  of 
10relatively minor importance in the context of irrigated agriculture.
Or  more  interest  are  seasonal  projections  of  ﬂuctations  associated  with  the  Southern 
Oscillation (also known as El Nino) and longer-term projections of climate change. 
Although the idea of policy certainty is a chimera, uncertainty about policy can be reduced 
through the adoption of transparent policy process, based on consistent principles. With such 
processes in place, policy changes arising from short-term political pressures or from the 
arrival new ministers and other ofﬁce-holders should be minimised. Policy change should 
arise primarily as the result of the arrival of unanticipated new information.
To achieve such stability, it is important that the establishment of the policy process should be 
based on clearly argued principles and should achieve a high degree of consensus. Otherwise, 
changes  in  the  balance  of  political  power  are  likely  to  lead  to  the  reversal  of  decisions 
imposed by temporary majorities. 
Managing risk
The idea of managing risk is central to modern thinking about uncertainty. It is intuitively 
obvious that irrigators can adopt strategies that increase or reduce their exposure to particular 
sources of risk. For example, a farmer whose entire area is planted to high-value crops that 
are highly sensitive to reductions in the volume of water applied generate a more risky ﬂow 
of income than those with a mixture of high-value and low-value, more robust crops. Farmers 
may also employ a range of market-base measures for risk management, such as futures 
markets and crop insurance.
Although this point is reasonably clear at an intuitive level, it has proved difﬁcult to represent 
adequately in the context of economic theories of production under uncertainty. The standard 
approach, based on the concept of a stochastic production function, implies that uncertainty 
increases linearly with expected output, allowing no real capacity for producers to manage 
risk.
Chambers and Quiggin (2000) show how a state-contingent representation of production can 
provide a more realistic representation of active risk management strategies. In addition, this 
representation allows for an integrated treatment of production-based and market-based risk 
11management strategies (Chambers and Quiggin 2004)
Principles of risk allocation
The central principle of risk allocation is that risk should be allocated to the party best able to 
manage it. The appealing simplicity of this principle masks some complex and intractable 
issues however. First, some risks are not easily separated and the party best able to manage 
one risk may not be able to manage other associated risks so well. Second, as noted by 
Chambers and Quiggin 2004, risk management has both technological and ﬁnancial aspects. 
In many cases, farmers are well placed to manage risk in a technological sense, but have 
limited acces to ﬁnancial markets, and can therefore not realise the full value of the risk 
management techniques at their disposal.
The Murray-Darling and the COAG process
Problems of risk and uncertainty have played a central role in the development of policies for 
the  management  of  the  Murray-Darling  Basin.  Quiggin  (2001)  presented  a  summary  of 
developments in policy for management of the Murray–Darling Basin from Federation to the 
late 1990s. Environmental problems and competition for water use became evident during 
the 1970s and acute during the 1980s, signalling the arrival of the mature phase in which the 
marginal social cost of water use is high and increasing over time. 
This process led to the imposition of a limit on aggregate extractions, referred to as the Cap, 
in 1995. The Cap was the ﬁrst step in the development of a comprehensive policy response, 
referred to as the Living Murray Initiative (Murray--Darling Basin Commission 2003). Under 
the Cap, it was agreed that the total allocation of water from the Murray--Darling Basin 
would not increase above the level prevailing in 1994. In future, any new allocation to one 
user would have to be matched by a reduction for some other user. 
The need for water allocations to be transferred between users naturally raised the issue of 
trade. The argument for trade in water rights is simple and appealing. The market would 
ensure  that  the  aggregate  allocation  of  water  could  be  capped,  and  ultimately  reduced, 
without imposing high costs on existing water users. Those who placed a high value on water 
could buy rights from those whose valuation was lower.
12The  central  idea  of  creating  a  market  for  trade  in  water  rights  is  that  rights  would  be 
reallocated  from  low-value  uses  such  as  pasture  to  high-value  uses  such  as  fruit  and 
vegetables. Although this reallocation would not, in itself, do anything for the environment, it 
would reduce the cost and the social and economic dislocation associated with reductions in 
the aggregate allocation of water.
It rapidly became apparent that this appealing idea was an oversimpliﬁcation of a complex 
problem. Water is not a homogeneous commodity. Water in one place, and at one time is not a 
good substitute for water in another place or at another time. Because it is heavy and bulky, 
moving water from one place to another or storing it over time is complex and extensive --- 
this is why irrigation is expensive.
Water  is  a  complex  commodity.  The  structure  of  rights  created  by  a  century  of  water 
management is even more so. At the time of the 1994 meeting of the Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG), few or no water users possessed property rights comparable to titles 
to  land.  The  closest  approximation  was  a  license  to  take  water,  typically  attached  to  a 
particular piece of land. On the other hand, a great many existing and potential users had 
expectations that water would be available to them.
As a result, the ﬁrst problem with water trading was to determine who had water rights. A 
major problem was the emergence of `sleepers' and `dozers'. These were landholders who had 
water licenses attached to their land, but had never used them (sleepers) or had ceased to use 
them (dozers). As soon as water became a tradeable commodity, the licenses held by such 
sleepers became a tradeable commodity. Since extractions from the Murray--Darling Basin 
were already at or near 100 per cent of natural ﬂows in 1994, it was not possible to allow 
both  the  allocation  of  water  to  `sleepers'  and  `dozers'  and  the  continuation  of  existing 
allocations  to  users  who  did  not  possess  guaranteed  rights.  With  some  exceptions,  the 
outcome was that users who had been receiving water under various provisions, but who had 
no speciﬁc entitlement, did not receive tradeable rights, while sleepers' rights were upheld. 
The interaction between poorly speciﬁed property rights and the unforeseen signiﬁcance of 
‘sleepers’ meant that the policy failed to produce the desired outcomes. In particular, while 
users who were allocated tradeable water rights beneﬁted from increased certainty, this was 
13more than offset by the greater uncertainty faced by the remaining users, whose collective 
claims considerably exceeded the available volume of water.
The National Water Initiative
By the end of the 20th century, it was clear that hopes for a rapid transition to a system of 
fully-tradeabe  water  rights  were  misplaced.  Many  risks  and  uncertainties  remained 
unresolvde. In this context, a new set of proposals was put forward at the 2003 Council of 
Australian  Governments    meeting,  which  produced  an  announcement  (but  not  a  detailed 
speciﬁcation) of a set of policy proposals referred to as the National Water Initiative (Council 
of Australian Governments 2003).
Two major principles were announced. The ﬁrst was that, in future, water allocations should 
be stated as shares of available water, rather than as speciﬁc volumes. This approach deals 
with ﬂuctuations in water availability by sharing the total amount available among users in 
proportion to their share. It raises the question of whether it will continue to be possible, as at 
present, to distinguish between high-security and low-security rights. The difﬁculties with 
this approach are discussed by Freebairn and Quiggin (2005).
The second principle concerned an approach to the sharing of risk arising from changes in the 
aggregate availability of water. Under this principle, the risk of changes in water availability 
due to new knowledge about the hydrological capacity of the system will be borne by users. 
The risk of reductions in water availability arising from changes in public policy, such as 
changes in environmental policy, will be borne by the public, and water users will receive 
compensation for such reductions.
The principles of the National Water Initiative were elaborated in more detail in a statement 
issued by the 2004 COAG meeting (Council of Australian Governments 2004).\ The 
Communique speciﬁed a framework that assigns the risk of future reductions in water 
availability as follows:  a framework that assigns the risk of future reductions in water 
availability as follows: –
•  reductions  arising  from  natural  events  such  as  climate  change,  drought  or 
bushﬁre to be borne by water users,
•  reductions arising from bona ﬁde improvements in knowledge about water 
14systems’ capacity to sustain particular extraction levels to be borne by water users up to 2014. 
After  2014,  water  users  to  bear  this  risk  for  the  ﬁrst  three  per  cent  reduction  in  water 
allocation, State/Territory and the Australian Government would share (one-third and two-
third shares respectively) the risk of reductions of between three per cent and six per cent; 
State/Territory and the Australian Government would share equally the risk of reductions 
above six per cent,
•  reductions arising from changes in government policy not previously provided 
for would be borne by governments, and
•    where  there  is  voluntary  agreement  between  relevant  State  or  Territory 
Governments and key stakeholders, a different risk assignment model to the above may be 
implemented; 
 The general principles set out in the NWI are consistent with the approach to risk allocation 
set out above. There are, however, numerous problems to be overcome.
In the short term, the consensus required to implement a policy of this kind was upset when 
the  Commonwealth  government  announced,  in  the  leadup  to  the  2004  election,  that  its 
contribution  to  the  NWI  would  be  funded  by  the  withdrawal  of  payments  to  the  states 
previously made as part of National Competion Policy.  The state governments immediately 
responded  by  withdrawing  from  the  NWI,  though  Queensland  has  since  announced  its 
conditional willingness to rejoin. Presumably, these disagreements will be patched up in due 
course, but the Commonwealth’s action was a serious breach of the notions of transparent and 
predictable  policy  essential  in  areas  of  this  kind,  and  increases  the  likelihood  of  more 
opportunistic policy changes in the future.
A second class of problems relates to implementation. Supposing that long-term averaage 
rainfall declines in line with the predictions of climate change models. It will be difﬁcult to 
determine whether the reduction is in fact due to climate change, or merely represents a run 
of dry years2. Although the risk in both cases is supposed to be borne by water users, it is 
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of Public Affairs, is also well-known for its rejection of scientiﬁc evidence regarding global warming.likely that the appropriate response and the resulting allocation of costs between users, will 
differ.
A more pressing problem relates to the transition from the current set of water rights, which 
involves serious over-allocation in many catchments, and over-allocation for the system as a 
whole, to a more sustainable level of use. Quiggin (2004) suggests a possible response, based 
on the fact that most existing rights are ﬁnite in duration, typically with a life of around ten 
years, but with an expectation of renewal. Rights will be due for renewal and conversion to 
permanent status around 2014 which also marks the end of the period when risks arising from 
changes in knowledge about sustainable capacity are borne entirely by users. Quiggin (2004) 
suggests that the adjustment path could be eased, and risk reduced, if governments offered to 
repurchase renewal rights or, equivalently, make a cash payment to growers in return for 
conversion of their existing rights into ﬁxed-term rights, with no option of renewal.
Concluding comments
 As  new  knowledge  about  water  systems  emerges  and  new  demands,  such  as  increased 
concerns  about  environmental  ﬂows,  arise,  policies  must  adjust.  The  adjustment  process 
inevitably  creates  uncertainty  for  both  new  and  existing  water  users.  It  follows  that  the 
allocation of risk and uncertainty is a crucial problem in the design of institutions for water 
management in Australia. 
Risk can not be eliminated but it can be managed. Improvements in risk allocation have the 
potential to yield substantial improvements in welfare. The National Water Initiative is a 
promise start, but much more remains to be done.
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